very happy to have a paper included in the mini-symposium on kant and cognition just published (finally!) over at synthese; my own paper is entitled ‘kant on the place of cognition in the progression of our representations‘
there is also a brief introductory note to help situate the discussion [image above]
the basic claim of the importance of distinguishing ‘cognition [erkenntnis]’ from ‘knowledge [wissen]’, for understanding kant’s theoretical philosophy, is something i’ve been advocating for for a while now (in a ucsd graduate seminar in spring 2012; in several talks in 2013-15; etc) — in their contribution, watkins and willaschek develop a detailed analysis of what this difference consists in (to complement their recent essay in the journal of the history of philosophy on kant’s account of cognition itself) — in my own essay, i supplement this key conceptual-terminological point by showing how kant’s differing conceptions of cognition and knowledge are systematically integrated into his broader philosophical psychology / philosophy of mind, including his account of ‘experience [erfahrung]’ as a form of specifically ’empirical’ cognition, his doctrine of apriori cognition in mathematics and philosophy, and his account of the mental activity that contributes to cognition but is nevertheless not itself a case of cognition (e.g., ‘sensation [empfindung]’, ‘intuition [anschauung]’, ‘perception [wahrnehmung]’, ‘consciousness [bewusstsein]’, ‘thinking [denken]’; see also my related paper in estudos kantianos) — in the latter respect, my symposium contribution is also something of a preview of some of the material on kant’s philosophical psychology / philosophy of mind that i’m currently working up into a book manuscript, so please feel free (encouraged!) to contact me with any thoughts/comments/criticisms/etc if you do take a look at the article, as they’ll be very welcomed!